The green development is a major strategy for adhering to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and is a timely move to lead the new norm of the economy and to continue reform the supply-side structure. China's green building market is in a period of steady growth, but there are still problems such as the unreasonable supply, demand structure and the uneven coordination of interests among all parties. Based on the perspective of the supply-side structure reform, this paper analyzes the positive external economic characteristics of both the "supply side" and the "demand side" of the green building development process, and constructs a dynamic game model between the government and the key subjects at both ends of the supply and demand, and proposes a government-based, real estate suggestions for developers and consumers. It is shown that there are positive external economic effects and market failure symbiosis in the initial stage of the green building development, and both the supply and the demand cannot meet the balance requirement of the Pareto efficiency. Only through the market's own resource allocation function to adjust the green building market structure and the limitations of the interests of various entities, the government's moderate intervention is conducive to the realization of the optimal interests and the balance of interests at both ends of the supply and demand, and help to accelerate the transformation and the upgrading of the traditional building market.
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