车道变换决策阶段，由于驾驶人对距离和速度判断失误，极易造成擦挂和追尾事故。为了明确车道变换决策形成机制以及此过程中交通冲突的诱发机制，基于决策阶段车辆间的运动关系及驾驶期望等，限定边界条件，提出车道变换博弈的概念。引入具有混合策略的二人有限零和灰色博弈模型，推导模型算法。结合实际道路试验前提下车道变换博弈样本的筛选和数据处理分析，研究博弈双方驾驶人的策略选择和收益特性。结果表明，当车道变换对象车与目标车道后随车的交通冲突不可避免时，对象车的理想最优策略是减速等待，而目标车道后随车的理想最优策略是加速通过临界冲突点，可以有效地兼顾博弈双方安全性与行车时间的收益需求，达到整体最优。研究结果可为车道变换过程中交通冲突的形成机制和路权分配提供相应的理论支持。
In the lane change decision-making stage, scratch and rear-end accidents may occur owing to drivers' miss judgments on the relative distances and velocities. In order to clarify the formation mechanism of drivers' decision making and traffic conflict in the lane change process, based on the motion relationship of related vehicles and driving expectation, the boundary conditions are limited, and a lane change game concept is put forward. The finite and zero-sum grey game model with mixed strategies is introduced, and the model algorithm is subsequently derived. Strategy selection and income characteristics of the drivers in the game are researched by sample selection and data processing analysis under the condition of real-world experiments. Analysis shows that when the traffic conflict between lane change object vehicle and following vehicle in the target lane is inevitably, the ideal and optimal strategy for the object vehicle is slowing down and waiting, while corresponding strategy for the game opponent is passing by the critical conflict point with an acceleration, so as to give the consideration to driving safety and traveling time, then achieve the goal of global optimality. The results may give corresponding theoretical support to the formation mechanism of the traffic conflicts and allocation of right-of-way in a lane change process.
