The "guardrail provisions" of the United States' CHIPS and Science Act are an important part of the U. S. semiconductor industry's development strategy. The primary purpose was to limit companies with leading-edge semiconductor technology from investing, expanding production, or providing technological licensing in China, as well as restricting U. S. institutions with advanced technology from cooperating with China's counterparts. The detailed regulations of the recently implemented CHIPS fund further clarified the scope of application, exceptions, and punitive measures under the "guardrail provisions". This article introduces the mechanisms of the "guardrail provisions", analyzes the impact of the "guardrail provisions" on the development of semiconductor industry and technological innovation. This article also proposes suggestions for China to respond to the blockade of the "guardrail provisions" from both domestic regulation and international rule perspectives.
DING Ru
. Implications of guardrail clauses in U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and suggestions for responsive strategies[J]. Science & Technology Review, 2024
, 42(17)
: 28
-40
.
DOI: 10.3981/j.issn.1000-7857.2023.12.01902
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